Reasons for China's Frequent Boder Intrusions & Options for Indian Response
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| India-China Relationships |
China is our neighbor country but our relationship with china is not so good and China is continuouslytrying to intrude in our country's border, presently china has launched a map according to which Andra Pradesh is in their country and their frequent intrusion in our countries border shows their bad will. Guys this post will clear you about India-china relationship from the beginning and also the current relationship status, also the reasons for Frequent Boder Intrusion and therefore the option for India to respond with. This is very important Group Discussion and Lecturette Topic- Frequently asked in SSB INterview.
Introduction
·
Historically, India
and China have had cordial relations for more than 2,000 years. The traditional
Silk Road not only served as a route for trade, but also promoted the spread of
Buddhism from India to China.
·
Modern relationship
between the two countries began in 1950, when India was amongst the first
countries to end formal ties with the Republic of China (Taiwan), and
recognize the People’s Republic China as the legitimate
government of Mainland China.
Contours of Indo-China Relations
·
On August 15, 1947,
India became an independent dominion under British Commonwealth and became a
federal, democratic republic.
·
On October 1, 1949 the
People’s Liberation Army defeated the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) of China
in a civil war and established the People's Republic of China.
·
Mao Zedong, the
Commander of the Liberation Army and the Chairman of the Communist Party of
China viewed Tibet as an integral part of the Chinese State and was determined
to bring Tibet under its direct administrative and military control.
·
Tibet serves as a
buffer zone between India and China. India regarded the Chinese forceful
occupation of Tibet as an act of aggression, while China considered India’s
posture on the issue as an interference in the internal affairs of the People’s
Republic of China.
·
In order to avoid
antagonizing the People's Republic of China, India brokered an agreement
between Tibet and China, where, Tibetan delegates signed an agreement in May
1951 recognizing PRC sovereignty but guaranteeing that the existing political
and social system of Tibet would continue.
·
In April 1954, India
and the PRC signed an eight-year agreement on Tibet that set forth the basis of
their relationship in the form of the Panchsheel or the Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence.
·
The critics of the
Panchsheel Agreement call this as a naïve act of Indian PM Nehru, that, in the
absence of credible military wherewithal or a clear policy for defence of the
Himalayan region, he saw this as India's best guarantee of security, by way of
establishing a psychological buffer zone in place of the lost physical buffer
of Tibet.
·
Consequently, up until
1959, despite border skirmishes and discrepancies between Indian and Chinese
maps, Chinese leaders amicably assured India that there was no territorial
controversy on the border and on the other hand India avoided bringing up the
border issue in high-level meetings.
·
India providing asylum
to the Tibetan head, Dalai Lama and thousands of refugees, who sought sanctuary
in Dharamsala and in Indian North East states, served as a trigger for the
People's Republic of China accusing India of expansionism into Tibet and
throughout the Himalayan region. China claimed 104,000 km² of territory
over which India's maps showed clear sovereignty, and demanded
"rectification" of the entire border.
·
China made a proposal
to India that it would relinquish its claim to most of India's northeast in
exchange for India's abandonment of its claim to Aksai Chin. The Indian
Government rejected the idea of a settlement based on uncompensated loss of
territory as being humiliating and unequal.
·
1962 Border disputes
resulted in a short border war between the People's Republic of China and India
on 20 October 1962.
·
The border clash
resulted in a crushing defeat of India as the PRC pushed the Indian forces to
within 48 Kms of the Assam plains in the northeast and also occupied strategic
points in Ladakh
·
Finally, on 21
November 1962, PRC declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew 20 Kms behind
its contended line of control.
·
In late 1967, there were two skirmishes between Indian and
Chinese forces in Sikkim. The first one was dubbed the "Nathu La
incident", and the other the "Chola incident", where exchange of
heavy fire took place at the Sikkim outpost.
·
During the whole conflict Indian losses were 88 killed and 163
wounded, while Chinese casualties were 300 killed and 450 wounded in Nathu La,
and 40 in Chola.
·
In 1967, a peasant uprising broke out in Naxalbari, led by
pro-Maoist elements. A pronunciation by Mao titled "Spring Thunder over
India" gave full moral support for the uprising. However, as the naxalite
movement disintegrated, the PRC withdrew its political support and turned non-committal
towards the various Indian groups.
·
During the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, the Chinese provided
them with military and morale support. In fact even now a lot of military
hardware held with Pakistan is of Chinese origin.
·
In 1980, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi approved a plan to
upgrade the deployment of forces around the Line of Actual Control to avoid
unilateral redefinitions of the line. India also increased funds for
infrastructural development in these areas.
·
In 1984, squads of Indian soldiers began actively patrolling the
Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly NEFA), which is north of
the McMahon Line as drawn on the Shimla Treaty map
·
The Indian team left the area before the winter. In the winter
of 1986, the Chinese deployed their troops to the Sumdorong Chu before the
Indian team could arrive in the summer and had built a Helipad at Wandu.
·
in 1986 and India's grant of statehood to Arunachal Pradesh
(formerly the North-East Frontier Agency) in February 1987 caused both sides to
deploy new troops to the area, raising tensions and fears of a new border war.
·
The PRC relayed warnings that it would "teach India a
lesson" if it did not cease "nibbling" at Chinese territory.
·
By the summer of 1987, however, both sides had backed away from
conflict and denied that military clashes had taken place.
·
Six rounds of talks of
the Indian-Chinese Joint Working Group on the Border Issue were held between
December 1988 and June 1993.
·
Progress was also made
in reducing tensions on the border via confidence-building measures, including
mutual troop reductions, regular meetings of local military commanders, and
advance notification of military exercises.
·
Border trade resumed
in July 1992 after a gap of more than thirty years, consulates reopened in
Bombay (Mumbai) and Shanghai in December 1992, and, in June 1993, the two sides
agreed to open an additional border trading post.
·
China eventually
recognized Sikkim as an Indian state in 2003, on the condition that India
accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as a part of China. This mutual agreement led
to greatly improve the Sino-Indian relations.
·
The year 2004 was a milestone in Sino-Indian bilateral trade,
surpassing the US$10 billion mark for the first time.
·
In April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Bangalore to push
for increased Sino-Indian cooperation in high-tech industries.
·
Regarding the issue of India gaining a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, on his visit, Wen Jiabao initially seemed to support the
idea, but had returned to a neutral position on the subject by the time he
returned to China.
·
In the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
Summit (2005) China was granted an observer status.
·
In Jan 2006 during an agreement was signed which envisages ONGC
Videsh Ltd (OVL) and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) placing
joint bids for promising projects elsewhere.
·
On July 6, 2006, China and India, after 44 years, re-opened
Nathula, an ancient trade route which was part of the Silk Road and had been
closed since the Sino-Indian War broke out in 1962.
·
In November 2006, China and India had a verbal spat over claim
of the north-east Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. India claimed that China
was occupying 38,000 square Kms of its territory in Kashmir, while China
claimed the whole of Arunachal Pradesh as its own.
·
In May 2007, China denied the application for visa from an IAS
officer in Arunachal Pradesh. According to China, since Arunachal Pradesh is a
territory of China, he would not need a visa to visit his own country.
·
In January 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited China and
met with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao and had bilateral
discussions related to trade, commerce, defence, military, and various other
issues.
·
In October 2009, Asian Development Bank formally acknowledging
Arunachal Pradesh as part of India approved a loan to India for a development
project there. Earlier China had exercised pressure on the bank to cease the
loan.
·
In April 2011, during the BRICS summit in China, the two
countries agreed to restore defence co-operation and China had hinted that it
may reverse its policy of administering stapled visas to residents of Jammu and
Kashmir.
·
Bilateral trade between the two countries reached US$73 billion
in 2011, making China India's largest trade partner, but slipped to US$66
billion in 2012. It is expected that trade between these two Asian economic
powers will reach US$100 billion by 2015.
·
A three-week standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in close
proximity to each other and the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh region and
Aksai Chin was defused on 5 May 2013.
·
The Chinese agreed to withdraw their troops in exchange for an
Indian agreement to demolish several "live-in bunkers" 250 km to
the south in the disputed Chumar sector.
·
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang made his first foreign visit to India
on 18 May 2013 in a bid to resolve border disputes and to stimulate economic
relations.
·
There have also been speculations on Indian side on how to
tackle the rising trade deficit with China which currently stands up at $40
Billion.
Reasons for Border Incursions by China
·
China does not accept
the Mc Mohan line as the legal delineation between India and China. It says
that this was a demarcation agreed upon between erstwhile British Raj and
Tibet.
·
There is no clear
demarcation of the boundaries, thereby leading to errors of perception and
understanding of previous agreements.
·
Incursions from China
continue despite protests and meetings by India. The intrusions are well
coordinated and show marked interest by the PLA in areas of military
significance.
·
China has highly
developed surface and air communication facilities all along the Tibetian
Autonomous Region (TAR), especially, opposite Arunachal Pradesh and is in the
process of preparing a dozen more airfields in Tibet.
·
Indian side on the
other hand, is highly under developed with difficult terrain and therefore,
builds up, movement and reinforcement of troops will be laborious and time
consuming.
·
Assertive stance of
China on the border is an indicator that it wants to stake its territorial
claims and also dissuade India from building up infrastructure along the
border.
·
Also, by slowly biting
into pieces of Indian Territory through continuous intrusions, the Chinese are
observing how India’s political leadership and its security forces react to
such provocation.
·
The PLA is training
for short and swift conflict preceded by a cyber-offensive. An offensive could
involve the use of missiles, anti-satellite weapons, overwhelming firepower and
control over the air space. The extent and scale of conflict would depend on
Chinese motives and intent.
·
China’s larger
strategy is to isolate India and keep it confined to the back waters of South
Asia through its policy of establishing a‘string of pearls’ by
increasing its influence over all neighbours of India, like, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and of course with its all-time ally
Pakistan.
What Should be India’s Stance Against Chinese Provocation
·
It is only through a
strong show of force and defence preparedness that the integrity of our borders
can be maintained. Hence, India has to move from a policy of dissuasion to
that of credible deterrence.
·
Let
us Compare India vs China Military Power:
INDIA CHINA
a. Active
Military Troops
13.25
22.55 lakh
b. Air
Force
3,000 Aircrafts
& 9,000
Aircrafts &
790 Fighter
Planes 2000 Fighter Planes
a. Navy
Fleet of 145 Vessels Fleet
of 284 Vessels
b. Strategic
Nuclear Def 200-400
Nuclear
50-70 Nuclear Warheads
·
The above comparison reveals that the military might of China is
nearly two to three times to that of India. So the question arises how do we
adopt the policy of credible deterrence?
·
Diplomatically, India must proactively resolve all issues and
differences with Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bhutan. The
invitation to all SAARC members by our new PM during his swearing in ceremony
was a step in this direction.
·
We need to actively pursue our ‘Look East Policy’, by engaging
all SE Asian nations, who have clashing interests with China in the South China
Sea.
·
Similarly, engaging a heavy weight like Japan in trade and
diplomatic ties will serve as a counter weight against China expansionism.
Specially, when Japan- China relations are at its worst because of the dispute
over the control of Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea. Our PM’s
visit to Japan is at this juncture is a diplomatic masterstroke.
·
Indian economy needs to be export driven rather than import
drive to be able to offset the trade deficit with China.
·
Besides the above actions, militarily, India needs to improve
its force level along the LAC and NE border with China; a new Mountain Corps is
being raised to meet this explicit requirement.
·
At the tactical level, there must be a renewed emphasis laid on
patrolling and surveillance using satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
and battle field surveillance radars. So as to appear more assertive and
forceful in projecting its footprints.
·
Deployment of strategic assets, keeping the threat perception in
mind, will serve as a serious deterrent and ‘a threat in being’. Agni V must be
operasionalised earliest for deployment with strategic forces.
·
Last but not the least, considering that China is our largest
trading partner, we must continuously engage China into meaningful talks and
sincerely endeavor to resolve the long outstanding border disputes amicably.
Contributor to this Post:
Facilitator and Trainer. He specialises in memory management, EQ and SQ. Has a vast experience in group skills development. , Ex Member Services Selection Board. (Trained at Defence Institute of Psychological Research, DRDO in Psychology with special focus on Competency based Evaluation through Group Dynamics) Held numerous training and motivational programmes on Leadership and Team Building for over 22 years. He is an expert in memory management.
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Deepak Tomar
I'm Deepak Tomar. I have completed my M.Tech in Computer Science and now i am working as a Govt. Employee in UP Police, I Love to help others and making friends, you can connect to me on facebook for any help- I will be happy to help you .
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